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11. Introduction 
Many economic problems are characterized by externalities across agents at the national 
and international level. Examples include imperfect competition, research and development 
with imperfect appropriation of research output, international trade, contagious diseases, 
international terrorism and transboundary pollution (Arce and Sandler 2004). It is well-
known that in the presence of externalities cooperation between agents can improve upon 
uncoordinated action. As shown for instance in Bloch (2003) and Yi (1997) self-enforcing 
cooperation proves easy (difficult) in the context of negative (positive) externalities from 
cooperation. If the enlargement of coalitions has a negative impact on outsiders, there are 
strong incentives to participate in cooperation and typically the grand coalition forms. The 
opposite is true for a positive impact, which applies to many examples of pure and impure 
public good provision. Then free-riding is encouraged and the formation of large and 
effective self-enforcing agreements proves difficult. Prominent and well-studied examples 
in the literature are international environmental agreements (IEAs).1 The difficulties of 
establishing effective global cooperation are underlined by the current efforts of negotiat-
ing a Post-Kyoto Protocol. 
Na and Shin (1998) point out that two issues have received little attention: a) the role of 
asymmetry and b) the role of uncertainty. They construct a public good model of coalition 
formation with three players. Players are symmetric with respect to abatement costs from 
individual abatement but receive different benefits from global abatement. Differences are 
due to different realizations of an individual benefit parameter. They show that if decisions 
are taken after uncertainty about the parameters is resolved, the grand coalition comprising 
all three players is never stable: the outcome of the game is either a two-player coalition or 
complete non-cooperation, depending on the degree of heterogeneity of the benefit 
1  The literature dates back to Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1992) and 
is surveyed for instance in Barrett (2003) and Finus (2003, 2008). 
2parameters. They contrast this case of full learning, which they call ex-post negotiations, 
with the case of no learning, which they call ex-ante negotiations. In the latter case, under 
the assumption of ex-ante symmetric expectations about the realization of the uncertain 
benefit parameters, they show that the grand coalition is stable. The coalitional equilibria 
under the two models of learning are compared from an ex-ante perspective. It is shown 
that the expected total payoff over all players under learning is lower than under no learn-
ing. This leads to the conclusion that the veil of uncertainty (a term coined by Brennan and 
Buchanan 1985) is conducive to the success of self-enforcing cooperation. Later papers 
with slightly different models have confirmed this conclusion (Kolstad 2007 and Kolstad 
and Ulph 2008 and 2009). 
Considering the model of Na and Shin (1998) one wonders which are the crucial assump-
tions that drive results, how general they are and whether there is a way to avoid this nega-
tive outcome. One extension which we rule out from the outset is to consider a different 
payoff function. Though Na and Shin’s payoff function is simple (linear benefits from 
global abatement and quadratic costs from individual abatement), it captures the main 
driving forces. The evaluation of the success of coalition formation requires the considera-
tion of a particular function anyway and more complicated functions would make analytical 
solutions difficult to obtain in the context of uncertainty. However, we also do not find it 
attractive to switch to the simpler payoff function with linear benefit and cost functions 
considered for instance in Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2008, 2009) as this leads 
to corner solutions in terms of equilibrium abatement choices, irrespective of the type of 
uncertainty. 
The most obvious extension is to allow for any number of players instead of only three 
players. For more than three players, even under no learning the grand coalition will not 
3necessarily form. Consequently, strategic interaction between coalition members and non-
members will be present when choosing abatement levels.  
The second extension is inspired by the work of Kolstad (2007), and Kolstad and Ulph 
(2008, 2009) who consider not only the polar cases of no and full learning (as in Na and 
Shin 1998), but also the intermediate case which they call partial learning. Partial learning 
means that players have to take their membership decision in the first stage under uncer-
tainty, but will learn the parameter values of the payoff function before they take abate-
ment decisions in the second stage. This implies de facto delayed learning as no uncertainty 
remains once players learn.2 Hence, in these models learning takes the form of perfect 
learning. That is, if players learn about parameter values, no uncertainty remains. 
The third and fourth extensions are motivated by the suspicion that asymmetry may be a 
crucial factor that leads to small coalitions under full learning. As we show in more detail 
below, Na and Shin’s assumption implies that there is pure uncertainty about the distribu-
tion of the benefits from global abatement, but the aggregate level of benefits is known. 
Hence, the third extension looks at the other extreme case, namely pure uncertainty about 
the level of benefits with symmetric realizations of the benefit parameters. This is what 
Kolstad (2007) calls systematic uncertainty. We consider a general version of this assump-
tion in the context of Na and Shin’s model. In contrast, the fourth extension sticks to pure 
uncertainty about the distribution of benefits but considers transfers to mitigate the asym-
metric distribution of the gains from cooperation. Both extensions (third and fourth) qual-
ify the negative conclusion about the role of learning. Interestingly, it turns out that with 
transfers asymmetry becomes even an asset.  
2  We stick to the terminology “partial learning” in order to relate our work to the literature on 
IEAs and uncertainty. 
4Finally, the fifth extension considers a mirror image of the Na and Shin (1998) model: pure 
uncertainty about the distribution of the costs from individual abatement, instead of 
uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Again, it turns out that the negative 
role of learning has to be qualified. For all extensions, we identify three effects (informa-
tion, strategic and distributional effect) which help to explain the role of learning. 
In the following, we outline our model in section 2. Section 3 analyzes the outcome under 
the various extensions. Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions and proposes some 
issues for future research. 
2. Model 
2.1 Coalition Formation 
Consider as in Na and Shin (1998) and in many other models on IEAs that countries 
decide in the first stage whether to join an agreement (in which case they are called signato-
ries) or to remain an outsider as a singleton (in which case they are called non-signatories). 
Players’ membership decisions lead to a coalition structure, { , }n mK S 1 !"  which is a parti-
tion of players, with n  being the total number of players (without restriction to n 3"  as in 
Na and Shin), m  the size of coalition S , m n# , and N  the set of players, S N$ . In this 
simple coalition formation game, coalition structure K  is entirely determined by coali-
tion S .  
In the second stage, given that some coalition S  has formed in the first stage, players 
choose their abatement levels iy . For a start, assume no uncertainty and that as in Na and 
Shin (1998) the decision is based on the following payoff function: 
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5where ib  is the parameter of the benefit function from global abatement (in the form of 
reduced damages, e.g. measured against some business-as-usual-scenario) and ic  the 
parameter of the cost function from individual abatement. Both parameters are assumed to 
be strictly positive. 
For signatories it is assumed that they derive their equilibrium abatement levels by maxi-
mizing the aggregate payoff to their coalition  
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where Sy  is the abatement vector of signatories, *( )iy S  is individual equilibrium abate-
ment of a signatory, which depends on S  and *jy  is individual equilibrium abatement of a 
non-signatory, which is independent of S . Comparing (2) and (3), it is evident that a coun-
try !  will abate more if it belongs to the coalition than if it remains outside. Equilibrium 
payoffs of the second stage are derived by substituting equilibrium abatement levels derived 
from (2) and (3) into payoff functions (1), which we denote by * ( )i S S% -  and 
* ( )j S S% 2 , 
respectively, noting that also non-signatories payoffs depend on S  as benefits depend on 
total abatement.  
Since the entire game is solved by backward induction, we now move back to the first 
stage, determining stable coalitions by applying the following definition: 
(4) internal stability:   . / . /* * \{ }i iS S i% %3  i S1 -  
(5) external stability:   . / . /* * { }j jS S j% %4 5  j S1 2 . 
6That is, no signatory should have an incentive to leave coalition S  to become a non-signa-
tory and no non-signatory should have an incentive to join coalition S . In order to avoid 
knife-edge cases, we assume that if players are indifferent between joining coalition S  and 
remaining outside, they will join the agreement. Coalitions which are internally and exter-
nally stable are called stable and the set of stable coalitions is denoted by *S . In case there 
is more than one stable coalition, we apply the Pareto-dominance selection criterion. We 
denote the set of Pareto-undominated stable coalitions by * *S6 $ . If non-trivial coali-
tions are stable, they Pareto-dominate the singleton coalition structure. Note that the coali-
tion structure comprising only singletons is stable by definition and hence existence of an 
equilibrium is guaranteed.3  
Note that this coalition formation model possesses three interesting properties which are 
helpful for the subsequent analysis and summarized in Lemma 1.  
Lemma 1: Properties of the Coalition Game 
Consider payoff functions (1) with equilibrium abatement levels derived from (2) and (3). Let S  and 
ˆ { }S S j" 5  be two coalitions formed in the first stage where Sˆ  is derived by one non-signatory j  joining 
coalition S .  
a) Positive Externality (PE): The payoff of a country ,k  which is neither a signatory of S  nor of ˆ,S  will 
be strictly higher under Sˆ  than S , i.e. * * ˆ
ˆ( ) ( )k S k SS S% %2 27 .  
b) Superadditivity (SAD): The aggregate payoff of the signatories of coalition S and of a non-signatory j  
is strictly lower than the aggregate payoff of the signatories of Sˆ , including the previous non-signatory j , 
i.e. * * * * *ˆ
ˆ
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3  The reason is that the singleton coalition structure can be generated by "9S , i.e. all players 
announce not to join the agreement. Then if one player changes her announcement, such that 
{ }S i"" , the coalition structure remains the same. 
7c) Global Efficiency from Cooperation (GEC): The aggregate payoff and the aggregate abatement level of 
all countries is strictly lower under S  than Sˆ , i.e. * *( ) ( )i k
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Proof: From the F.O.C. in (2) it is evident that if country j  joins coalition S , such that Sˆ  
forms, it will choose a higher abatement level, as well as all signatories of S , but all remain-
ing non-signatories’ abatement levels remain constant. Hence, total abatement will be 
higher if Sˆ  than if S  forms (GEC with respect to abatement). Moreover, countries which 
are neither signatories of S  nor of Sˆ  will have higher benefits but the same costs and 
hence higher payoffs (PE). SAD follows from . / . /max. max.
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(  because of the presence of externalities and because abatement strategies 
of all non-merging singletons remain constant. Finally, GEC with respect to aggregate pay-
offs follows from combining properties PE and SAD. (Q.E.D.) 
Global Efficiency from Cooperation (GEC) makes it interesting from a normative point of 
view to analyze the prospects of cooperation. The highest (lowest) global abatement level 
and the (lowest) highest total payoff is obtained in the grand coalition (if all countries play 
as a singleton) which corresponds to the social optimum (Nash equilibrium). Note that the 
property GEC also holds under uncertainty, which we consider later by taking expectations 
over the uncertain parameters. This will be useful when evaluating the success under the 
three models of learning below. The Positive Externality (PE) explains why the formation 
of large stable coalition is difficult, despite Superadditivity (SAD) holds. Starting from no 
cooperation and forming gradually large coalitions, the SAD-effect is gradually outweighted 
by the PE-effect. Again, these effects are also present under uncertainty. 
82.2 Learning Scenarios 
We now assume that some parameter values of the payoff functions are uncertain. 
Following Na and Shin (1998) and many other papers, we assume risk-neutral agents as 
players are governments and not individuals. Additional to Na and Shin (1998) and as in 
Kolstad and Ulph (2008, 2009), we also consider the scenario of partial learning, which 
gives rise to the following three learning scenarios: 1) full learning, 2) partial learning and 3) no 
learning. Full Learning (abbreviated FL) can be considered as a benchmark case in which 
players learn about the true parameter values before taking the membership decision in the 
first stage. Hence, uncertainty is fully resolved at the beginning of the game. For Partial 
Learning (abbreviated PL) it is assumed that players decide about membership under 
uncertainty but know that they will learn about the true parameter values before deciding 
upon abatement levels in the second stage. Hence, the membership decision is based on 
expected payoffs, under the assumption that players will take the correct decision in the 
second stage. Finally, under No Learning (abbreviated NL) also the abatement decision has 
to be taken under uncertainty. That is, players derive their abatement strategies by maxi-
mizing expected payoffs. The membership decisions are also taken based on expected pay-
offs, though these payoffs differ from those under partial learning, given that less informa-
tion is available.  
Thus, viewed together, uncertainty is symmetric: all players know as much or little than 
their fellow players. FL and PL are identical regarding the second stage. Hence, differences 
and similarities between these two learning scenarios in terms of overall outcomes must be 
related to the first stage. Both scenarios differ from NL as abatement decisions under NL 
are based on expected payoffs. All three scenarios differ with respect to the first stage. The 
determination of stable coalitions is based on known payoffs under FL, expected payoffs 
given that abatement decision will be based on realized parameter values under PL and 
expected payoffs based on expected parameter values under NL. 
9In the following, we analyze four cases. Case 1 is the Na and Shin (1998) case, assuming 
(pure) uncertainty about the distribution of the benefits from global abatement. Case 2 is 
the Kolstad (2007) case, assuming (pure) uncertainty about the level of the benefits from 
global abatement. Case 3 is the Na and Shin (1998) case with transfers. Case 4 is a mirror 
image of the Na and Shin (1998) case, assuming pure uncertainty about the distribution of 
the costs from individual abatement, considering both, no transfers and transfers. 
3. Results 
3.1 Case 1: Uncertainty about the Distribution of Benefits without 
Transfers 
Na and Shin’s case requires assuming cost symmetry and hence we set i jc c c" " , 
i N ,1 -  in payoff function (1) and define ii
b
c
: " , which we call from now onwards the 
benefit parameter. If this parameter is uncertain, it is represented by the random variable 
i;  with associated distribution if; . Like in Na and Shin (1998), i:  is viewed as an individ-
ual parameter. Moreover, expectations about i;  are symmetric, though realizations are 
asymmetric as the random variables are correlated. Na and Shin (1998) consider only three 
players with benefit parameters uniformly distributed over a set of three positive values. 
We also adopt a uniform distribution, but as we consider an indefinite number of players, 
we have to define a specific set of benefit parameter values over the set of players. Hence, 
we assume the following probability distribution: 
(6) . /
1
0
i
i
i
for k , k N
f n
otherwise
;
:
:
< " -=
" >
=?
 
which implies the following expected value, @ AiE ; , and variance, @ AiVar ; : 
(7) @ A 1
2
i
n
E ;
8
"  and @ A
2 1
12
i
n
Var ;
!
"  . 
10
In this setting, correlation means that all players have a different benefit parameter: 
i k , i k N: :B 1 B - . Thus, vector . /1 n,...,; ; ;"  is composed of all the elements of N , 
i.e. 
1
n
i
i
N
"
; "# .  
For the interpretation of this and the following cases, it is helpful to define the level of 
benefits from global abatement as 
1
n
i
i
L
"
" ;# . Hence the marginal benefit of player i  can 
be written as i iL; C"  where iC  represents the individual share in global benefits. In case 
1, the level L  is constant. Thus, uncertainty is purely about the shares, or the distribution of 
benefits from global abatement.  
For FL and PL, equilibrium abatement levels of the second stage follow directly from (2) 
and (3), assuming i jc c c," "  i N ,1 -  and letting ii
b
c
: " . For NL, payoffs in (2) and 
(3) have to replaced by expected payoffs. However, as payoffs are linear in the random 
variables k; , certainty equivalence holds. That is, the maximization of expected payoffs is 
equivalent to the maximization of payoffs under certainty for @ Ak kE: ;" .  
Before proceeding to the first stage, it is already informative to compare second stage out-
comes. For this, we take an ex-ante perspective and compute equilibrium expected abate-
ment and payoff levels also in the case of FL and PL. Note that there is an immediate link 
between individual and total expected levels: individual levels are a fraction n  of total 
levels. This is due to the ex-ante symmetry of all countries – they do not know whether 
they will be signatories or non-signatories. Thus, in the following analysis and proofs, we 
concentrate on total expected levels. 
1Lemma 2: Expected Abatement and Payoffs in the Second Stage in Case 1 
Let D En mK S ,1 !"  be some coalition structure with coalition S  of size m . Under all three learning 
scenarios, the following relations hold ex-ante in case 1: 
Individual and Total Expected Abatement Levels: FL PL NL" " . 
Individual and Total Expected Payoff Levels: FL PL NL" #  with strict inequality if S NB .  
Proof: See Appendix 1. (Q.E.D.) 
It is clear that FL and PL are identical as there are no differences in the second stage. With 
respect to abatement, there is also no difference to NL. This suggests that despite there is 
over- and undershooting in terms of optimal abatement levels under NL, compared to the 
realizations of the random benefit parameter i; , on average this cancels out. This is differ-
ent for payoffs.  
Consider first the grand coalition, S N" , corresponding to the social optimum. Then 
there is no strategic interaction between players. We call the payoff difference between 
learning and no learning in the grand coalition the information effect from learning. In 
other words, the information effect measures the value of information in the absence of 
any strategic interaction and stability considerations. A priori we know that this informa-
tion effect cannot be negative – it can only be zero at worst. For S N"  the first order 
conditions require setting the sum of marginal benefits over all players equal to individual 
marginal abatement costs. By assumption, in case 1, also under NL the sum of marginal 
benefits is known. Hence, the information effect from learning is zero.  
Consider now any other coalitions structure different from the grand coalition S NB  
where there is interaction between players. We call the payoff difference between learning 
and no learning in these coalition structures the strategic effect from learning. This effect is 
2negative according to Lemma 2. In order to explore the intuition behind this result, let us 
take the extreme case where no non-trivial coalition forms, which corresponds to the Nash 
equilibrium.4 Under FL and PL, all countries will choose a different abatement level, as all 
have a different parameter ii
b
c
: "  due to different ib ’s. This is not cost-effective as all 
have the same cost parameter c . In contrast, under NL, due to symmetric expectations 
about i; , all countries choose the same abatement level which is also inefficient as under 
FL and PL (i.e. marginal abatement costs are not set equal to the sum of marginal benefits), 
but at least cost-effective (i.e. all marginal abatement costs are equal). Thus, the negative 
strategic effect from learning is a cost-effectiveness effect here. Put differently, getting it on 
average right across all players in terms of costs is more important than getting it individu-
ally right.  
We now move to the first stage and determine stable coalitions. In order to make coalition 
formation interesting, we assume henceforth n 33 . We find: 
Lemma 3: Equilibrium Coalitions in the First Stage in Case 1 
In case 1, under the three scenarios of learning, the expected equilibrium coalition size *E[m ]  is given by: 
3*PL *NLE m E mF G F G" "H I H I   and  
1 3
2 4
*FL
if n
E m
if n
"<
F G " >H I 3?
  
where under FL for 4n 3  the only stable coalition is formed by the two players with the highest i: .  
Proof: See Appendix 2. (Q.E.D.) 
For NL the intuition is straightforward. As pointed out above, due to certainty equivalence, 
equilibrium abatement levels correspond to those under certainty if the parameters k:  are 
equal to the expected value of k; . Due to ex-ante symmetric expectations, we have 
                                                
4  The idea is illustrated for two players in an emission game in Ulph (1998). Other examples 
with negative value of information in non-cooperative equilibria are discussed for instance in 
Gollier and Treich (2003). 
3symmetric payoff functions. For payoff function (1) it is well-known from the literature 
(see e.g. Finus 2003) that the stable coalition comprises three signatories if 3n 3 .5 Also 
under PL the ex-ante symmetry leads to the same stable coalitions, though certainty 
equivalence does not hold. This is different for FL where due to asymmetric realizations of 
i;  signatories receive asymmetric payoffs, implying that only smaller coalitions are stable. 
If n 43 , only the two countries with the highest benefit parameter find it attractive to 
form a coalition.  
The driving force of this result is what we call the distributional effect from learning: the 
payoff difference of various degrees of learning due to the stability of different coalitions. 
The intuition is along the lines of Young (1994), borrowing the concept of the veil of 
uncertainty from Brennan and Buchanan (1985), who argues that agreements are easier if 
potential participants do not know the distributional consequences.6 Since stable coalitions 
depend on second stage outcomes, it is generally difficult to disentangle the distributional 
from the strategic effect. However, this poses no problem when FL and PL are compared 
as second stage outcomes are identical: it is the payoff difference between FL and PL due 
to different coalition sizes, resulting from different distributions of the gains from co-
operation among coalition members. 
Hence, compared to Na and Shin (1998), we also confirm for PL the stable coalition size of 
3, but this is not the grand coalition as long as there are more than three countries. Like in 
Na and Shin (1998) the coalition size under FL falls short of the coalition size under NL, 
and, as just confirmed, also under PL. 
                                                
5  Note that similar small coalitions are obtained for other strictly concave payoff functions as 
long as one does not assume Stackelberg leadership of signatories (see Finus 2003). 
6  The idea is also illustrated in a simple two-player model in Helm (1998) and in Kolstad (2005). 
4We now combine the first and second stage outcomes to evaluate the overall success of 
IEAs.  
Proposition 1: Outcome in Case 1 (Uncertainty about the Distribution of Benefits 
without Transfers) 
In case 1, under the full, partial and no learning scenario, expected equilibrium total abatement levels and 
expected total payoffs are ranked as follows: 
1) Total Abatement: NL PL FL" 4   
2) Total Payoff:  
3
4
NL PL FL if n
NL PL FL if n
" 4 "<
>
4 4 3?
 . 
Proof: Relations between NL and PL follow directly from Lemmas 2 and 3. For the rela-
tion between PL and FL, we note that second stage outcomes are the same. For n 3" , 
3 1*PL *FLE m E mF G F G" 4 "H I H I  and hence PL FL4  follows from property GEC (Lemma 1). 
For n 34 , though 3 2*PL *FLE m E mF G F G" 4 "H I H I , the identity of players matters for FL, as 
a two-player coalition among the players with the highest i:  produces a higher abatement 
and payoff level than an average two-player coalition. Hence, we compute expected abate-
ment and payoffs under PL assuming 3*PLE mF G "H I  and compare them with those levels 
under FL where a coalition among the two countries with the highest benefit parameters is 
formed, n 1!  and n , which delivers the result. The relations between NL and FL follow 
directly from the relations between NL and PL as well as PL and FL. (Q.E.D.) 
Hence, the negative role of learning as concluded by Na and Shin (1998) is confirmed for 
more than three players including the intermediate case of partial learning. The strategic 
effect from learning is negative, leading to worse outcomes under FL and PL. Additionally, 
the distributional effect from learning makes FL even worse than PL. 
53.2 Case 2: Uncertainty about the Level of Benefits 
It became evident that the asymmetric realization of the random benefit variable i;  is a 
driving force for the negative outcome under learning, regardless whether we consider PL 
or FL. Hence, we consider the other extreme assumption with pure uncertainty about the 
level of the benefits from global abatement. In order to capture this, we again assume cost 
symmetry, i jc c c" "  i N1 - , and again define ii
b
c
: " . However, now uncertainty does 
not relate to an individual but a common parameter, which Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and 
Ulph (2008, 2009) call systematic uncertainty. Again, all players have the same expectations 
ex-ante, but now, once uncertainty is resolved, all countries have also the same benefit 
parameter ex-post, i k; ;"  i, k N1 - . Thus, uncertainty is perfectly and positively corre-
lated. More important, however, it is to note that in case 2 uncertainty is de facto about the 
level of the benefits from global abatement. For the subsequent analysis, no assumption about 
the functional form of the probability distribution 
i
f;  is required (as for instance in 
Kolstad 2007). We proceed as in case 1, looking first at second stage outcomes, then at first 
stage outcomes and finally combine both. 
Lemma 4: Expected Abatement and Payoffs in the Second Stage in Case 2 
Let D En mK S ,1 !"  be some coalition structure with coalition S  of size m . Under all three learning 
scenarios, the following relations hold ex-ante in case 2: 
Individual and Total Expected Abatement Levels: FL PL NL" " . 
Individual and Total Expected Payoff Levels: FL PL NL" 4 . 
Proof: See Appendix 1. (Q.E.D.) 
Again, over- and undershooting under NL compared to the realizations of i; , which is 
now systematic, cancels out on average. However, the relations in terms of payoffs are 
6reversed to case 1. The symmetric realizations of i;  implies that also under FL and PL 
abatement is cost-effectively allocated in all possible coalitions structures. Though over-
shooting under NL is associated with additional benefits, this is costly due to strictly 
convex cost functions. The additional costs are higher than the cost savings when there is 
undershooting. Thus, more information is beneficial if there is systematic uncertainty. This 
is confirmed when evaluating overall outcomes in Proposition 2, as Lemma 5 shows that 
first stage outcomes are the same under all three scenarios of learning. 
Lemma 5: Equilibrium Coalitions in the First Stage in Case 2 
In case 2, under the three scenarios of learning, the expected equilibrium coalition size *E[m ]  is given by: 
3*FL *PL *NLE m E m E mF G F G F G" " "H I H I H I  . 
Proof: See Appendix 2. (Q.E.D.) 
Proposition 2: Outcome in Case 2 (Uncertainty about the Level of Benefits) 
In case 2, under the full, partial, and no learning scenario, expected equilibrium total abatement levels and 
expected total payoffs are ranked as follows: 
1)  Total Abatement: FL PL NL" "   
          
2) Total Payoff:  FL PL NL" 4  . 
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 4 and 5. (Q.E.D.) 
Taken together, our intuition that Na and Shin’s negative result hinges on the asymmetric 
realization of the random benefit variable i;  is confirmed. The strategic effect from learn-
ing is now positive and hence no longer upsets second stage outcomes under FL and PL 
(see Lemma 4). Additionally, the distributional effect from learning is zero, posing no 
longer a disadvantage to FL in terms of the size of stable coalitions (see Lemma 5). 
73.3 Case 3: Uncertainty about the Distribution of Benefits with 
Transfers 
Another possibility to avoid the negative outcome of case 1 is transfers. Transfers can 
address the negative distributional effect from learning. They are relevant for FL, but have 
no effect on PL and NL as membership decisions are based on expected payoffs which are 
symmetric among signatories and also among all non-signatories. Therefore, transfers will 
affect the ranking between FL and PL, FL and NL, but not the ranking between PL and 
NL.  
More precisely, the analysis proceeds as follows. First, note that the maximization 
procedure in the second stage (see (2) and (3)) implies transferable utility and hence 
equilibrium abatement levels are not affected by transfers. (Hence, transfers have no impact 
on the information and strategic effect.) This is different for first stage outcomes. Generally 
speaking, many transfer schemes have been considered in the literature on IEAs (e.g. 
Barrett 2001, Botteon and Carraro 1997, Bosello et al. 2003, Eyckmans and Finus 2006 and 
Weikard et al. 2009). However, in order to avoid the sensitivity of outcomes regarding par-
ticular assumptions, we apply the concept of an almost ideal sharing scheme (AISS) pro-
posed by Eyckmans and Finus (2009) of which similar notions are found in Fuentes-
Albero and Rubio (2009), McGinty 2007 and Weikard (2009). They argue that if and only 
if: 
(8) potential internal stability:   . / . /* * \{ }i ii S i SS S i- -3( (% %   
holds, then there exists a transfer system which makes S  internally stable. A transfer 
system for which every potentially internally stable coalition is internally stable belongs to 
the AISS, which gives each coalition member its free-rider payoff, *( \{ })i S i% , plus some 
positive share of the surplus ( S )J " * *( ) ( \{ })i ii S i SS S i% %- -!( ( . For every transfer 
system belonging to the AISS, coalition S  is externally stable if and only if all larger coali-
8tions { }S j5 , considering all possible fringe player j S2  joining coalition S , are not 
potentially internally stable. Taken together, this means that every transfer scheme 
belonging to AISS will lead to the same set of internally and externally stable coalitions and 
hence set of stable coalitions (robustness). Most important, among those coalitions that can 
be potentially internally stabilized, i.e. ( )S 0J 3  (which may not be possible for large 
coalitions because ( )S 0J 7 ), AISS stabilizes (in the sense of internal and external stability) 
those with the highest aggregate welfare over all players (optimality). This property hinges 
on only one structural property, namely the (weakly) positive externality (PE) from 
coalition formation. As known from Lemma 1, this property holds even in its strong 
version in our coalition formation game. Applying AISS to our setting, we derive the 
following result. 
Lemma 6: Equilibrium Coalitions in the First Stage in Case 3 
In case 3, under the three scenarios of learning, the expected equilibrium coalition size *E[m ]  is given by: 
3*PL *NLE m E mF G F G" "H I H I   and  . /
3 8
3 9
*FL
if n
E m
f n if n
#<=F G " >H I 4 3=?
  
where under FL all possible 3-player coalitions are stable if 8#n , no stable coalition comprises less than 
three players if 9n 3  and ( )f n  increases in n .  
Proof: See Appendix 2. (Q.E.D.) 
As pointed out above, the outcomes of PL and NL are not affected by transfers. The 
coalition size under FL does no longer fall short of those under PL and NL. To the 
contrary, if n  is large enough (i.e. n 93 ), the coalition size will be larger than under PL 
and NL. Due to the assumption about the distribution of the variables i; , the degree of 
asymmetry among players (measured as the variance of the elements of the vector ; ) 
9increases with the number of players n . This asymmetry is conducive to the size of stable 
coalitions if accompanied by an appropriate transfer scheme. The intuition is the following. 
Cooperation among some players compared to the non-cooperative status quo typically 
serves two purposes. First, internalizing an externality among coalition members by 
choosing higher abatement levels than under no cooperation. This is a benefit every coali-
tion member enjoys and, in fact, also non-signatories, as exemplified by the property PE 
(see Lemma 1). Second, equalizing marginal abatement costs across coalition members and 
hence reaping the gains from cost-effectiveness. This is an exclusive benefit only the coali-
tion enjoys as a group that does not spread to non-signatories. This is captured by the 
property superadditivity (see Lemma 1). This exclusive benefit is higher for heterogeneous 
than for symmetric players. It is particularly pronounced here as without cooperation pay-
offs would be very low: the Nash equilibrium would be particularly inefficient as marginal 
abatement costs differ between players under FL (as they do under PL). Taken together, 
compared to case 1, under FL, transfers reduce the negative distributional effect from 
learning or may even transform it into a positive effect. Overall, this leads to the following 
result. 
Proposition 3: Outcome in Case 3 (Uncertainty about the Distribution of Benefits 
with Transfers) 
In case 3, under the full, partial, and no learning scenario, expected equilibrium total abatement levels and 
expected total payoffs are ranked as follows: 
1) Total Abatement: 
8
9
FL PL NL if n
FL PL NL if n
" " #<
>
4 " 3?
 
2) Total Payoff:  
3
4 8
9
10
FL PL NL if n
NL FL PL if n
NL FL PL if n
FL NL PL if n
" " "<
= 4 " # #=
>
4 4 "=
= 4 4 3?
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Proof: The ranking between PL and NL follows from Proposition 2 as transfers have no 
effect. The ranking between PL and FL follows from the same second stage outcomes 
(Lemma 2), the same or different first stage outcomes (depending on n ) as given in 
Lemma 6 and applying property GEC (Lemma 1). The ranking between FL and NL is 
established in three steps. Step 1: For total abatement, we combine second stage outcomes 
in Lemma 2, first stage outcomes in Lemma 6 and apply property GEC. Step 2: For n 3"  
and 4 n 8# # , the same reasoning as in step 1 applies for the relation between total pay-
offs under FL and NL. Step 3: For n 93 , NL produces better second stage outcomes than 
FL (Lemma 2), but FL produces larger stable coalitions (Lemma 6). Hence, under FL, for 
each n 9,3  we consider all possible : -vectors and compute the expected total payoff over 
all Pareto-undominated stable coalitions.7 Then, we compare this to the expected total pay-
off under NL with 3*NLE mF G "H I . (Q.E.D.) 
Taken together, the ranking between FL and NL, as established by Na and Shin (1998) and 
which is our case 1, changes with transfers if the degree of asymmetry between players is 
large enough. Then the veil of uncertainty is no longer conducive to cooperation but has a 
negative impact. Thus, transfers may be seen as a successful safety valve or hedging strat-
egy in the presence of uncertainty about the distribution of benefits. 
3.4 Case 4: Uncertainty about the Distribution of Costs 
In this final section, we consider a mirror image of Na and Shin’s case (case 1), namely 
uncertainty about the distribution of abatement costs. For completeness, we consider a 
subcase without and a subcase with transfers. The mirror image means benefit symmetry, 
i.e. i jb b b" "  i N1 - , but cost asymmetry in payoff function (1). For simplicity, we again 
define i
i
b
c
: "  and assume the same distribution as in (6). Now, correlated uncertainty 
7  As we could not obtain a closed form solution for the expected total payoff, the values in step 
3 were obtained through an algorithm programmed with the software package Matlab. 
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stems from the cost parameter ic , with i k , i k N: :B 1 B - , 
1
n
i
i
N
"
; "# . For second stage 
outcomes, we find: 
Lemma 7: Expected Abatement and Payoffs in the Second Stage in Case 4 
Let D En mK S ,1 !"  be some coalition structure with coalition S  of size m . Under all three learning 
scenarios, the following relations hold ex-ante in case 4: 
Individual and Total Abatement Levels: FL PL NL" 4 . 
Individual and Total Payoff Levels: FL PL NL" 4 . 
Proof: See Appendix 3. (Q.E.D.) 
Comparing case 4 (Lemma 7) with case 1 (Lemma 2) clearly shows that relations in terms 
of expected total payoffs are reversed. Both the information and the strategic effect, when 
comparing FL or PL with NL, are now positive. In the presence of asymmetric abatement 
cost functions, additional information allows non-signatories to better target abatement 
levels and signatories to allocate abatement duties cost-effectively. The cost savings 
compared to NL show up in higher payoffs and allows choosing higher abatement levels 
on average under FL and PL. For first stage outcomes, we establish the following. 
Lemma 8: Equilibrium Coalitions in the First Stage in Case 4 
In case 4, under the three scenarios of learning, the expected equilibrium coalition size *E[m ]  is given by: 
3*PL *NLE m E mF G F G" "H I H I  and  
2*FLE mF G "H I  in the case of no transfers where the only stable coalition is formed by the two players with 
lowest i:  and  
3*FLE mF G "H I  in the case of transfers, where all coalitions of three players are stable. 
Proof: See Appendix 3. (Q.E.D.) 
12
Again, the result for coalition sizes under the scenarios NL and PL are not surprising due 
to symmetric expected payoffs on which membership decisions are based. Without trans-
fers, FL suffers from the negative distributional effect from learning, leading to smaller 
coalitions than under PL and NL. In contrast to case 1, it is now the two players with the 
lowest parameter i: , i.e. the steepest abatement cost function, which form a stable coali-
tion under FL. For all other players, the free-rider incentive is stronger than the cost-saving 
potential from cooperation. With transfers, the distributional effect from learning is zero as 
the size of stable coalitions is the same as under PL and NL. Different from case 3, under 
FL no larger coalition than three will be stable. The intuition is that now the cost-saving 
potential from cooperation with learning is lower than in case 3 as the benchmark case 
without cooperation, i.e. the Nash equilibrium, is no longer cost-ineffective. Thus, through 
a higher cost-saving potential, uncertainty about the distribution of benefits (case 3) 
provides a higher incentive for cooperation than uncertainty about the distribution of costs 
(case 4).  
Pulling Lemma 7 and 8 together, an overall comparison follows almost immediately. 
Proposition 4: Outcome in Case 4 (Uncertainty about the Distribution of Costs) 
In case 4, under the full, partial, and no learning scenario, expected equilibrium total abatement levels and 
expected total payoffs are ranked as follows: 
No Transfers 
1) Total Abatement: 
3 8
9
PL NL FL if n
PL FL NL if n
4 4 # #<
>
4 4 3?
 
2) Total Payoff:  
3 7
8
PL NL FL if n
PL FL NL if n
4 4 # #<
>
4 4 3?
 
Transfers 
1) Total Abatement: FL PL NL" 4  
2) Total Payoff:  FL PL NL" 4  . 
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Proof: For transfers all relations follow directly from Lemma 7 and 8. For no transfers, 
relations between PL and NL also follow directly from Lemma 7 and 8. For FL, we 
compute expected total abatement and payoff levels using the information that the players 
with the lowest i:  values, i.e. players 1 and 2, form a two player coalition. For PL and NL 
we compute expected payoffs using the information that 3*PL *NLE m E mF G F G" "H I H I . A 
comparison then delivers the ranking between FL and PL as well as FL and NL. (Q.E.D.) 
Hence, with transfers, learning, in the form of FL or PL, is always better than no learning, 
NL, though there is no difference between PL and FL. Without transfers, PL is always 
better than FL and NL. FL is better than NL if n  is sufficiently large. The intuition is that 
for sufficiently large n  the first stage advantage of NL over FL becomes less important 
(the effect of a slightly larger coalition diminishes in the presence of many non-signatories), 
giving more weight to the second stage advantage of FL over NL. 
4. Summary and Conclusions  
The starting point of our analysis was the negative conclusion of Na and Shin (1998) about 
the value of information in a public good game of coalition formation. We addressed two 
general questions. How general is this result? What are the driving forces? The first ques-
tion was analyzed by pointing out that in Na and Shin (1998) uncertainty is symmetric and 
about the parameters of the payoff functions. In particular, uncertainty is about the distri-
bution of the benefits from the provision of the public good “global abatement” with ex-
ante symmetric expectations but ex-post asymmetric realizations of the benefit parameter. 
We confirmed Na and Shin’s negative result in a more general setting which allowed for 
any number of players and considered not only the learning scenarios no and full learning, 
but also the intermediate scenario partial learning. In a two-stage coalition formation game, 
no learning means that players never learn the true parameter values, partial learning that 
they find out about them after the first (membership decision) but before the second stage 
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(abatement decision), and full learning that they know them before the first stage. We 
denoted this setting case 1. This was contrasted with cases 2, 3 and 4. Case 2 did not focus 
on uncertainty about the distribution but the level of the benefits from public good 
provision. Case 3 stuck to uncertainty about the distribution of the benefits but introduced 
a transfer scheme to balance asymmetric gains from cooperation among coalition 
members. Case 4 was the mirror image of case 1 and considered uncertainty about the 
distribution of the costs of public good provision. For completeness, this was done not 
only without but also with transfers.  
It became apparent that a departure from Na and Shin’s setting leads to more positive 
results about the role of learning. In case 2 the value of information is always positive, 
when comparing full or partial learning with no learning. In case 3, the negative value of 
information of case 1 could be partly mitigated. Transfers left no and partial learning unaf-
fected but improved upon full learning. The larger the asymmetries among players, in the 
form of different realizations of the benefit parameter, the larger are the gains from co-
operation which can now be fully reaped through a transfer scheme. In other words, diver-
sity becomes an asset if accompanied by an appropriate transfer scheme. Also in case 4, the 
mirror image of case 1, which assumed uncertainty about the distribution of the costs, the 
negative effect of learning was less pronounced and was clearly positive with transfers. 
In all four cases, three main effects (though to a different extent and with different signs) 
were at work, called the information, strategic and distribution effect. The information 
effect basically means that, in the absence of strategic interaction, i.e. when the grand coali-
tion forms, more information cannot decrease the expected aggregate payoff. The strategic 
effect refers to the impact of learning on expected payoffs for all coalition structures where 
there is strategic interaction between players, i.e. the grand coalition does not form. We 
showed that in Na and Shin’s setting this strategic effect from learning is negative such that 
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full and partial learning rank worse than no learning in terms of expected payoffs. Finally, 
once stability of coalitions is considered, the distribution of the gains from cooperation 
among coalition members becomes an issue. In Na and Shin’s setting this distributional 
effect from learning is negative under full learning. Asymmetry of the benefit parameter 
translates into asymmetry of the gains from cooperation, upsetting large stable coalition. 
With transfers, however, this asymmetries can be balanced. The distributional effect may 
become even positive – leading to larger stable coalitions than under no and partial learning 
– as the aggregate gains from cooperation to coalition members increase with diversity.  
Taken together, our results suggest that the veil of uncertainty may be good if the uncer-
tainty about the distribution is larger than about the level of the gains from cooperation. 
This is particularly true if the distribution of the gains from cooperation is more asymmet-
ric ex-post than ex-ante expected. For such cases, a transfer scheme is helpful which 
hedges against possible asymmetries. Since asymmetries are the result of diversity, and 
diversity allows for larger comparative advantages from cooperation, transfers may even 
turn an apparent disadvantage into an advantage. Moreover, it appears that Na and Shin’s 
setting of pure uncertainty about the distribution of the benefits from the provision of a 
public good is an interesting but also a special assumption. For many economic problems, 
uncertainty about the level of the benefits as well as uncertainty about the costs of public 
good provision will be important too. In such cases the positive effect of the veil of uncer-
tainty is less evident from our model which is certainly a relief to all those that believe that 
learning should be beneficial. 
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Appendix8 
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemmas 2 and 4 
For FL and PL, abatement and payoffs in cases 1, 2 and 3, are given by (using (2) and (3) in 
the text).  
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Taking expectations gives: 
Cases 1 and 3: 
(III) . / . / @ A . /. /
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8  For some proofs we only provide the intuition due to space limitations. Details are available 
upon request. 
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Case 2: 
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In this case 2kE F GH I;  remains unspecified, as no assumption about the distribution of the 
random variables is necessary for the analysis.  
For NL, certainty equivalence holds. Thus, in cases 1, 2 and 3, payoffs and abatement are 
the same as those under certainty with @ Ak kE": ;  k N1 - : 
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where in cases 1 and 3 @ A . /kE n 1 / 2" 8; .  
III
The equality of expected total abatement in the three learning scenarios follows directly 
from (III) and (VII) for case 1 (Lemma 2), and (V) and (VII) for case 2 (Lemma 4). 
Regarding expected total payoffs, using (IV) and (VIII), we find for case 1 (Lemma 2): 
. / . /
. /. /. /21 1
24
FL PL NL
n n m n m
E S , E S ,"
8 8 ! !
F G F G! " !H I H I% ; % ;  which is strictly nega-
tive for n m4 , implying S NB , and zero if n m" , implying S N" , for all m,n N-  and 
m n# . For case 2 (Lemma 4), using (VI) and (VIII), we find:  
. / . /FL PL NLE S , E S ,"F G F G! "H I H I% ; % ; @ AkVar ;  where @ AkVar 04;  by assumption. 
Appendix 2. Proof of Lemmas 3, 5 and 6 
Lemma 3: For PL and NL we use expected payoffs in (IV) and (VIII), respectively, and 
apply definition (4) of internal and definition (5) of external stability which delivers the 
result. For FL, in case 1 we note that there are : -vectors with asymmetric entries. Conse-
quently, *[ ] 37FLE m , as it can be shown, using payoffs in (II) and the definition of internal 
stability in (4) that for all non-symmetric : -vectors no coalition of three or more players is 
internally stable. The particular result that only the single coalition is stable if 3"n  and 
comprises the two players with the highest i:  if 43n  is also immediately derived by using 
(II) and (4).  
Lemma 5: For PL and NL the result follows from applying definition (4) of internal and 
definition (5) of external stability to payoffs (VI) and (VIII), respectively. For FL the 
equilibrium coalition size immediately follows from symmetry. 
Lemma 6: Transfers do not affect the outcomes under PL and NL. For FL we first prove 
that all coalitions of three or less players are potentially internally stable using payoffs in (II) 
and the definition of potentially internal stability in (8). Given the relation between poten-
tial internal stability and external stability, it follows that all coalitions strictly smaller than 3 
IV
must be externally unstable and hence cannot be stable. Thus, *[ ] 33FLE m  follows. Now it 
suffices to show that potential internal stability is violated for all coalitions larger than three 
players if 8#n , considering all possible : -vectors in case 3 up to these thresholds (and 
hence *[ ] 3FLE m "  follows). Above these thresholds, we show that there is at least one : -
vector of the form (1,2,3, )n  for which potential internal stability holds. Since either one 
these 4-player coalitions or larger coalitions are externally stable, we can conclude that 
*[ ] 34FLE m . 
Appendix 3. Proof of Lemmas 7 and 8 
Lemma 7: In case 3, assuming i jb b b" "  i N1 - , using i ib / c: " , the payoff function 
can be written as 
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with abatement and payoffs under FL and PL as follows: 
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The corresponding expected values are: 
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Under NL, given a coalition structure D E1( n m )K S, !"  has formed in the first stage, equilib-
rium abatement strategies are given by: 
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which give rise to the following expected payoffs in the second stage 
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Using (XII) and (XIV) we get: 
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Using (XIII) and (XV) we get: 
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Lemma 8: For PL and NL the result follows from applying definitions (4) and (5) of stabil-
ity to payoffs (XIII) and (XV), respectively. For FL with no transfers the equilibrium coali-
tion size follows from applying the definitions (4) and (5) of stability to payoffs (XI); with 
transfers, by using payoffs (XI) and the definition of potential internal stability (8) we show 
that only coalitions with size D E1 2 3m , ,-  are internally stable under the AISS. From the 
relation between internal and external stability for this sharing scheme, we conclude that 
the only externally stable coalitions are those of size 3m 3 . Hence, the only Pareto 
undominated stable coalitions are those of size 3m " . 
